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ABSTRACT 
 
Noted scholars argue that (1) economic models of capital taxation have been inadequately adapted to 
owner-managed enterprises and (2) capital structure researchers have used the wrong models while also 
improperly measuring key variables. Thus, a model that can overcome these problems should be of interest 
to academics when teaching capital structure theory and practitioners when determining optimal debt 
levels. This paper contributes to capital structure practice by using a model that is adaptable to owner-
managed enterprises like pass-throughs while also containing relevant variables that are measurable. This 
paper should be valuable to academics and practitioners in the following ways. First, we examine the effects 
of personal tax rates on a pass-through’s capital structure choice. Second, we offer rules for managers of 
pass-throughs on how to choose an optimal amount of debt. Third, we show that increasing market risk 
by doubling betas does not affect our major conclusions governing a pass-through. Fourth, we compare 
the pass-through and C Corp gains to leverage values when all factors are the same except tax rates that are 
unique to the ownership type. 
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I. Introduction 
In contrast to C Corps that are taxed at the corporate and personal levels, pass-
throughs only pay personal taxes1.  Since the interest paid on debt lowers corporate taxes, 
a pass-through will ceteris paribus have a tax disadvantage when issuing debt compared 
to a C Corp. The tax differences between pass-throughs and C Corps lead to research 
questions governing pass-throughs such as: What will be the role of personal taxes in 
determining the amount of debt issued by a pass-through? What rules of thumbs might 
we offer to pass-through executives when making their debt-equity choice? Can we say 
anything about the role of market risk in the decision-making process for pass-through 
executives? How much debt should a pass-through issue compared to a C Corp? These 
questions are of considerable important and interest to both capital structure researchers 
who seek to explain the capital structure choice and practitioners who are charged with 
choosing the capital structure for companies. In this paper, we will supply answers to all 
of these questions. 
Before we can answer the above-mentioned questions, we need an adequate 
model. Discovering such a model is problematic for owner-managed enterprises as 
characterized by pass-throughs. Henrekson and Sanandaji (2011) point out that 
economic models of capital taxation have been inadequately adapted to owner-managed 
enterprises. In their review of the capital structure literature, Graham and Leary (2011) 
argue that researchers have explained only part of the observed behavior. They add that 
researchers have also studied the wrong models and issues while improperly measuring 
key variables. 
In trying to identify an adequate model for both pass-throughs and C Corps, we 
can began by examining the popular model of Modigliani and Miller (1963), referred to 
in this paper as MM. This model offers a corporate tax-based equation for computing a 
company’s gain to leverage (GL) that focuses on C Corps and the deductibility of their 
interest payments. Extensions of MM provide insight that are applicable to modeling 
pass-throughs. For example, a number of post-MM researchers (Farrar and Selwyn, 
1967; Myers, 1967; Stapleton, 1972; Stiglitz, 1973) have explored the implications of 
                                                 
 
 
1 Throughout this paper, we will not use the word corporation to avoid the confusion between a C 
Corporation that pays corporate taxes and an S Corporation that is a pass-through tax entity that does not 
pay corporate taxes. We will refer to a C Corporation as a C Corp and an S Corporation as an S Corp. 
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personal taxes for choosing a capital structure. As noted by Myers, a key point of Farrar 
and Selwyn's argument was all-equity financing is possible when personal taxes enter the 
capital structure decision-making process. Copeland et al. (2004) mention arguments, as 
early as Farrar and Selwyn and Brennan (1970), for optimality in the face of personal 
and corporate taxes. Jensen and Meckling (1976) show optimality without taxes due to 
agency considerations. 
The personal tax rate research culminated with Miller (1977) whose GL equation 
can be applied to pass-throughs even if corporate taxes are nonexistent. Many papers 
since the work of MM and Miller have relaxed the assumption of taxes. For example, 
Copeland et al. discuss this issue to include the work of Miller and Scholes (1978). 
Regardless, the two traditional GL equations given by MM and Miller are limited since 
the role of discount rates are not fully incorporated. For example, there is nothing in 
their equations to tell us how a change in equity’s discount rate (caused by issuing debt) 
directly affects GL. This paper addresses this inadequacy by using the Capital Structure 
Model (CSM) perpetuity framework. Thus, this is the model we have identified as 
adequate for computing GL for both a pass-through and C Corp. 
The seminal work on the CSM is given by Hull (2007) who uses the MM-Miller 
framework that includes an unlevered firm with level perpetuities, two security types 
where debt is issued to retire equity, and no growth. Equity is valued by perpetuity 
models because it has no maturity date. Even though debt has a maturity date, it can also 
be valued as a perpetuity because companies set long-run target leverage ratios. This 
implies that a chosen amount of outstanding debt can be rolled over endlessly to maintain 
the target. The CSM’s GL equation is derived by subtracting the definition for unlevered 
firm value from the definition for levered firm value. By using definitions with discount 
rates (or borrowing costs), the derivation is able to incorporate these rates into a GL 
equation. Discount rates are dependent on the degree of the company’s market risk and 
the extent of the debt-for-equity transaction and allows maximum gain to leverage (max 
GL) and maximum firm value (max VL) to be discovered from a variety of possible debt-
for-equity choices. 
We will now overview this paper’s four major findings stemming from its four 
research questions. First, we apply the CSM for two situations concerning the effective 
personal tax rates on equity earnings (TE) and on debt earnings (TD). To begin we apply 
the CSM for the situation where TE > TD and then for the situation where TD > TE. 
When comparing the outcome for these two situations, we find that a pass-through 
achieves a higher max GL and a greater optimal debt-equity ratio (ODE) where relatively 
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more debt is issued when TE > TD. However, the pass-through achieves a lower max VL 
than it would if TD > TE held. Thus, a greater max GL advantage with a lower personal 
tax rate on debt cannot offset the loss from paying greater taxes on equity income that 
still causes a lower max VL. Of importance to pass-through managers, our results are 
robust for innumerable tests where we vary the two personal tax rates within a large range 
of possible values. 
Second, and of practical importance, we offer rules for managers of pass-throughs 
on how much equity to retire in a debt-for-equity transaction. These rules are robust in 
their applicability for pass-throughs that are in a position to profit from issuing debt.  
Third, we discover that different assumptions about an enterprise’s beta do not 
affect our major conclusions even though GL and VL are much smaller when betas are 
doubled (due to before-tax cash flows remaining fixed while discount rates increase). 
Thus, despite the disagreement about the size of betas for smaller enterprises (like pass-
throughs) that are backed by venture capitalists (VCs) and angel investors, this 
disagreement does not materially affect pass-through decision-making. 
Fourth, we compare a pass-through to a C Corp where we assume matching 
before-tax cash flows and matching discount rates that serve to generate equal unlevered 
equity values before taxes are considered2.  We conduct tests using four sets of tax rates 
and two sets of market risk. For all of these tests, we find a pass-through attains lower 
max GL values and lower ODEs compared to a C Corp. Despite lower GL values, we 
illustrate that the pass-through form of ownership consistently achieves higher VL values 
for all debt-for-equity choices. While a C Corp achieves a greater max GL value from its 
use of debt, its max VL remains below that for a pass-through since its greater max GL 
value cannot overcome its disadvantage of paying corporate taxes. 
The remainder of this paper is as follows. In Section II, we discuss two general 
ownership structures; identify effective tax rates associated with each ownership 
structure; and, examine the nature of equity and debt for pass-throughs and C Corps. 
Section III introduces the CSM equation used in this paper and relevant computations 
to get values for variables used in our analysis. Section IV applies the CSM equation to 
                                                 
 
 
2  The after-tax unlevered equity value used in our illustrations and comparison will be about $12 million. 
For the past fifteen years, a typical size for an IPO has been over $100 million. While we use equity values 
that are relatively small, the results of our comparison should hold for a variety of other sizes. 
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a pass-through. Section V compares our pass-through results with those of a C Corp. 
Section VI offers final comments and avenues for future research.  
 
II. Ownership Structures, Tax Rates, and Borrowing Forms  
 
This section briefly discusses ownership structures for a pass-through and a C 
Corp. We next identify expected effective tax rates applicable to each ownership 
structure. These rates will be used in our illustrations. Finally, we examine the nature of 
debt and equity borrowings as pertains to both a pass-through and a C Corp. 
A. Two ownership structures: Pass-throughs and C Corps 
 
There are two distinct ownership forms in terms of tax structures. First, the pass-
through structure pays taxes at only the personal level thereby avoiding corporate taxes. 
Individual pass-through types include sole proprietorship, partnership (general or 
limited), limited liability company and S Corp. Second, the C Corp structure pays 
corporate taxes and its owners of equity and debt pay personal taxes. Thus, a C Corp is 
double taxed by paying at both the corporate and personal levels. 
With double taxation for C Corps, a new enterprise should find a pass-through 
ownership structure as potentially more favorable. This notion is supported by Knittel et 
al. (2011). They write that about 93% of small businesses file as pass-throughs with about 
half of these being sole proprietors. Although companies are more likely to file as a pass-
through ownership form, some of these companies will become a C Corp ownership 
form especially if they arrive at a stage where limited liability is desired and more funds 
are needed by going public with an initial public offering (IPO). An IPO helps broaden 
a firm’s investor base through ongoing seasoned equity offerings and large bond 
issuances. 
B. Effective tax rates for pass-throughs and C Corps 
 
The IRS (2015) writes that pass-through owners pay a personal income tax and 
the full self-employment tax of 0.153. Pomerleau (2015) reports that a pass-through can 
pay a rate as high as 0.396 at the federal level. In addition, like all enterprises, it can be 
subject to state, county, city, unemployment, disability, and sales taxes. However, there 
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are also factors reducing what all companies pay. These include the graduated rate 
structure and allowable tax deductions and tax credits. 
SBA (2009) cites a study by the Government Accountability Office that the 
average effective personal tax rate is 0.25 for pass-throughs. Using an equal-weighted 
average measurement based on ownership category, they report a lower effective tax rate 
of 0.22. They also provide numbers for smaller pass-throughs where they estimate an 
average effective tax rate of 0.20. In terms of the pass-through types, they report that S 
Corps have an average effective tax rate of 0.27 followed by partnerships at 0.24 and sole 
proprietorships at 0.13. The graduated rate structure can help explain why larger pass-
throughs have higher average effective tax rates than smaller pass-throughs. 
The above numbers are consistent with that reported more recently by the 
National Federation of Independent Business (2013) for pass-throughs where estimates 
range from 0.15 to 0.32 for personal effective tax rates. Regardless of the source, it should 
be pointed out that personal tax rate estimates for pass-throughs can vary depending on 
the size, industry, applicable special tax provisions and the type of pass-through. Thus, 
robust tax rate tests are needed before any general conclusions can be made when valuing 
a pass-through. For this paper’s purposes when testing an average pass-through’s gain to 
leverage, it appears that a range from 0.20 to 0.25 is a reasonable effective personal tax 
rate range. 
Pomerleau (2015) writes that if a C Corp pays the maximum U.S. corporate tax 
rate of 0.35, then it faces an average total tax rate of near 0.57 with average state and 
personal taxes considered. This compares with pass-throughs that face an average total 
tax rate of 0.47. While these numbers may represent an average ceiling, there is also an 
average floor. Lyon (2015) notes that the alternate minimum corporate rate of 0.20 sets 
a floor for what a profitable C Corp will pay in federal taxes. State and local governments 
can impose income taxes adding to this floor. Consistent with what analysts believe C 
Corps pay, Harpaz (2013) and Ro (2013) suggest a range from 0.20 to 0.30 for the 
effective corporate rate. The National Federation of Independent Business (2013) offers 
an estimate of 0.27. 
Spiegelman (2015) notes that the maximum personal tax rate for both dividends 
and long-run capital gains will remain at 0.20 for 2015. However, for short-term capital 
gains, investors in C Corps can pay the same effective personal tax rate of 0.396 that is 
paid by investors in pass-through earnings. For C Corp owners, a top rate of 0.15 applies 
to qualified dividends and the sale of most appreciated assets held over one year. Long-
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term capital gains tax can be avoided if C Corps shares are never sold. The new Medicare 
tax rate can push all personal tax rates up by 0.038. 
Given the above tax rate numbers, what effective personal tax rates might one 
reasonably use for pass-throughs and C Corps? For a typical pass-through, we suggest 
personal tax rates from 0.20 to 0.25. For C Corps, we estimate personal tax rates of 0.05 
for equity income and 0.15 for debt income. These latter rates factor into consideration 
not only lower rates for investors in C Corps compared to pass-throughs but also the fact 
personal taxes paid by equity investors on capital gains can be deferred by not selling 
stocks that have gone up significantly in price. Pass-throughs can avoid corporate taxes 
altogether so we assign zero corporate tax rates for a pass-through, while we estimate that 
a typical C Corp will pay an effective corporate tax rate from 0.20 to 0.30 as suggested 
by the research given above. 
In light of the above discussion, we can ask the question: Does the pass-through 
ownership form have an overall tax advantage? According to current tax laws, it appears 
that on the surface that the answer is “yes.” Gale and Brown (2013) write the largest 
benefit that many businesses receive through the tax code is being able to organize as a 
pass-through and avoid the dual taxation of corporate income found with C Corps. Even 
if pass-throughs have a tax advantage given current laws, it is problematic to predict this 
advantage will last in the long-run. This is because federal, state, local government, and 
other tax rates change frequently and major legislative acts can completely shift an 
advantage from one ownership structure. For example, the Tax Reform Act of 1986 
lowered the personal tax rate below the corporate rate causing pass-throughs to increase 
in popularity. To illustrate this increase in popularity, Sullivan (2011) notes that S Corps 
accounted for 4.6% of business receipts in 1985 but 17.5% of receipts by 2008. He adds 
that limited liability companies (LLCs) provided less than 1% of business receipts in 
1988 but accounted for 7.3% twenty years later. The growth in LLCs was boosted by 
the 1988 IRS ruling that allowed LLCs to be taxed as partnerships. Burnham (2012) 
illustrates how the increase in pass-throughs since 1986 has come at the expense of C 
Corps. In conclusion, any tax advantage an ownership structure provides an enterprise 
should be considered as somewhat tenuous. 
C. Two forms of borrowings: Equity and Debt 
 
We will now discuss the nature of the equity and debt involved for both pass-
throughs and C Corps. While there are differences and similarities, we cannot make a 
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definite judgment as to whether one form of ownership should unequivocally have riskier 
forms of borrowing than the other. 
The most common source of equity funding for pass-throughs comes from VCs 
consisting of wealthy individuals, government-assisted sources, or major financial 
institutions. Prior to VC funding, angel investors are often vital to pass-throughs with 
some research suggesting that angel investors are as important for high-growth startup 
investments as are VC firms (Kerr et al., 2014; Shane, 2012). The common source of 
equity fund for C Corps is public offerings of stock where many individuals and 
institutional clienteles are likely to be found. As residual owners, equity investors of all 
ownership forms are more willing to take a long-term view of the business in hopes of 
making capital gains. By not requiring immediate cash flows, more funds are available 
from equity capital compared with debt capital where investors require timely and regular 
interest payments. This should hold regardless of ownership structure. 
For large companies, there are agency conflicts involving the separation of 
management from owners. To the extent that pass-throughs are more apt to be owner-
managed enterprises, they are more likely to avoid these agency conflicts compared to 
large C Corps where the owner and manager functions are separate. One agency conflict 
involves dilution of ownership. For example, when new equity investors enter an 
enterprise as owners, current equity owners can have their cash payments and voting 
rights diluted. This creates agency problems between the current owners and potential 
investors. Researchers such as Leland and Pyle (1977) and Myers and Majluf (1984) 
address this issue in an information asymmetry context. They do this by suggesting that 
when current owners dilute their ownership such as selling ownership to outsiders, then 
this signals negative news to the market about the company’s future prospects. 
Furthermore, it can be expensive to reverse this dilution process as buying back 
ownership shares can require expensive premiums over current market prices. This 
dilution issue and its effects can hold regardless of ownership structure. 
Like C Corps, some pass-throughs can take on debt by issuing notes, bonds, and 
other obligations. While large C Corps can float large bond issues and undertake a variety 
of large short-term borrowings, pass-through debt financing can include regional and 
national mezzanine borrowings. Silbernagel and Vaitkunas (2010) write that while there 
are no hard and fast rules for optimizing a company’s capital structure, companies that 
are ahead of the curve use an efficient combination of senior debt, mezzanine debt, and 
equity capital to minimize their true cost of capital. This implies that any agency costs 
are also minimized. Regardless of whether the debt belongs to a pass-through or C Corp, 
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debt has the advantage of being a less expensive form of borrowing as it attracts investors 
who are willing to accept a rate of return below equity owners in exchange for more 
secure payments. Of importance to C Corps, the interest paid to debtholders lowers the 
corporate taxable income. 
For both pass-throughs and C Corps, agency costs and benefits from debt can be 
present. For example, debt owners have the power to restrict management decision-
making leading to a variety of possible agency costs including those related to paying out 
of earnings, project selection and financing of operating assets. Researchers such as 
Masulis (1980), Leland (1998), Myers (1977) and Gay and Nam (1998) document these 
agency costs including those related to underinvesting and overinvesting when debt and 
equity owners have different agendas. 
Beside negative agency effects related to debt, Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue 
that agency effects can also be positive. Jensen (1986) suggests the agency effect of debt 
has a way of restraining unnecessary extravagant behavior that squanders free cash flows. 
In regards to the latter agency notion, pass-throughs should be more immune from 
squandering as managers and owners are more likely to be the same person. Bathala et al 
(2006) examine debt-equity agency conflicts for small firms and find results supporting 
the Smith and Warner (1979) costly contracting hypothesis that suggests control of debt-
equity conflicts through financial contracts can increase the value of the firm. 
 
III. Capital Structure Model (CSM)  
 
In this section, we describe the GL equation used in this paper. We also introduce 
the four sets of tax rates and two discount rates scenarios used in our major tests. Finally, 
we illustrate computations for GL, VL, ODE and other variables that contain useful 
information associated with capital structure decision-making. 
 
A. CSM non-growth equation 
 
Hull (2007) coined the phrase the Capital Structure Model (CSM) to describe 
his approach to evaluate a debt-for-equity transaction. Hull (2014) recently reviewed 
both the mainline capital structure research and the CSM research related to this paper. 
The intuition or insight behind the CSM is to begin with the definition that GL = VL – 
VU where levered firm value (VL) and unlevered value (VU) are each defined in terms of 
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a perpetuity after-tax cash flow that is discounted by its cost of borrowing. A clear-cut 
optimal debt-to-equity ratio (ODE) can result since each increasing debt-for-equity 
choice generates an increasing cost of levered equity and cost of debt that causes GL to 
eventually begin falling. 
The CSM extends the perpetuity GL line of research originating in Modigliani 
and Miller (1963), referred to as MM, and continued by Miller (1977). Unlike MM and 
Miller, the CSM debt-for-equity GL equations lead to well-defined ODEs consistent with 
trade-off theory (DeAngelo and Masulis, 1980; Hackbarth et al., 2007; Berk et al., 2010; 
Korteweg, 2010; Van Binsbergen et. al., 2010). The CSM also offers equity-for-debt GL 
equations yielding ODEs. The CSM represents an innovative approach that generates a 
set of GL equations with multi-component equations. Besides discount rates, the CSM 
framework can incorporate growth rates, wealth transfers (with a levered situation as the 
starting point), and changes in tax rates. 
Keeping the MM and Miller unlevered and non-growth conditions where the 
plowback ratio (PBR) is zero, Hull (2007) derived the non-growth GL equation utilized 
in this paper. This equation is 
 
    D E
LG  = 1      1           
 UD
U
L L
D Errr r      (1) 
 
where D→E indicates a debt-for-equity transaction; α = (1 )(1 )(1 ) E CD
T T
T  with TE, TC and 
TD as the effective tax rates on equity, corporate, and debt incomes; rD, rU and rL are the 
costs of debt, unlevered equity and levered equity; D = (1 ) D
D
T I
r
  with I as the perpetual 
interest payment; and, EU (also referred to as VU) = (1 )(1 )C
U
E CT T
r
   with C = 
(1−PBR)(CFBT) where PBR = 0 since (1) assumes non-growth and CFBT is the perpetual 
cash flow before taxes. 
The 1st component of (1) is positive given D
L
r
r
  < 1 should hold under reasonable 
scenarios. Hull (2007) argues this component represents a positive tax-agency effect. This 
positive agency effect is explained because this component is positive when α = 1, which 
represents a situation where tax rates are offsetting such that (1–TE)(1–TC) = (1–TD) 
with one combination being TE = TC = TD = 0. The 2nd component is negative because 
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U
L
r
r  < 1 holds. Hull states this component embodies a negative financial distress effect 
caused by increasing rL values as debt increases such that the component becomes more 
negative as debt increases. Thus, Hull asserts (1) can be described as 
    D E
LG   = POS + NEG       (2) 
where POS = 1      
D
L
Drr > 0 and NEG =    1  
    
U
U
L
Err  < 0. With a negative component, 
it becomes possible to identify an optimal leverage ratio. 
B. Variables, values and computations 
 
Table 1 defines variables and reports values used in this paper’s applications. This 
table reports four sets of tax rates as determined by the two general ownership structures 
and two sets of discount rates based on two schools of thought about a smaller enterprise’s 
market risk as determined by its beta (β). These two sets of discount rates cause before-
tax unlevered firm values to range from about $7.3 million to about $15 million. These 
values are smaller company values if we compare them to the median IPO offer size that 
has been over $100 million since 2000. The justification for the four sets of tax rates with 
their assigned values were given earlier in Section II.B. We now discuss the rationale for 
these two sets of discount rates. 
A first school of thought is that discount rates for smaller entrepreneurial 
enterprises (such as those backed by VCs and angels) are similar to an average publicly 
traded stock that would have a market beta (βM) of 1. Thus, smaller firms can be classified 
as “normal market risk.” An argument for a normal market risk classification (or even 
lower) is that larger firms outperformed smaller firms during the 1990s and the first 
decade of the 21st century. Furthermore, historically high returns for small publicly 
traded stocks have been explained in terms of a number of factors other than greater 
market risk. These factors include a January effect as first documented by Rozeff and 
Kinney (1976) as well as transactions costs and illiquidity. Thus, discount rates 
computed using the CAPM can reasonably assume that the beta of an unlevered smaller 
company (ΒU) is similar to βM, which is to say ΒU = 1. However, what about smaller 
companies associated with VCs and private equity companies? Cochrane (2005) finds 
that, after controlling for selection bias, VC investments perform like public traded 
stocks. Malinowski and Wittlin (2013) suggest private equity does not outperform public 
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equity in a manner that would be expected especially if one adjusts for greater leverage 
for private equity. Thus, the assumption of ΒU = 1 for smaller firms appears to be a 
reasonable assumption. 
A second school of thought is that smaller entrepreneurial enterprises are riskier 
than a typical traded stock due to greater market risk. Thus, they should be classified as 
“high market risk.” This is consistent with the notion that smaller firms are often 
financed by investors who require much larger returns. Thus, if this notion holds, it 
follows that ΒU for small firms should be much larger than one. The assumption that ΒU 
> 1 is consistent with Reyes (1990) who reports betas from 1 to near 4 for VC backed 
enterprises. Cochrane (2005) suggests ΒU = 2 for IPOs (1/3 of which are VC backed) but 
also points out the difficulty in accurately measuring betas. 
Due to lack of clarity as what beta to use for a smaller enterprise when estimating 
discount rates, this paper’s analysis as seen in the bottom of Table 1 will consider beta 
assumptions of ΒU = 1 and ΒU = 2 when examining a pass-through and a C Corp. Another 
reason to test two divergent betas is simply to determine if beta’s size actually influences 
capital structure decision-making when using the CSM framework. This latter reason is 
a strong motivation for considering two contrasting betas. 
 
Table 1: Variables Defined and Values Assigned 
1st Set of Pass-through Tax Rates: TC Pass-Through = 0; TE Pass-Through = 0.20; TD Pass-Through = 0.25 
α Pass-Through = (1 )(1 )(1 )
E C
D
T T
T
 
  = 
(1 0 .20)(1 0)
(1 0 .25)
 
 = 1.066667 
2nd Set of Pass-through Tax Rates: TC Pass-Through = 0; TE Pass-Through = 0.25; TD Pass-Through = 0.20 
α Pass-Through = (1 ) (1 )(1 )
E C
D
T T
T
 
  = 
(1 0 .25)(1 0)
(1 0 .20)
 
 = 0.937500 
1st Set of Corporation Tax Rates: TC Corporation = 0.20; TE Corporation = 0.05; TD Corporation = 0.15 
α Corporation = (1 )(1 )(1 )
E C
D
T T
T
 
  = 
(1 0.05)(1 0 .20)
(1 0 .15)
 
 = 0.894118 
2nd Set of Corporation Tax Rates: TC Corporation = 0.30; TE Corporation = 0.05; TD Corporation = 0.15 
α Corporation = (1 ) (1 )(1 )
E C
D
T T
T
 
  = 
(1 0 .05)(1 0 .30)
(1 0 .15)
 
 = 0.782353 
Cash Flow before Taxes = CFBT = $1,654,135.34 rF = risk-free rate = 0.05 rM = market rate = 0.11 
1st Discount Rate Scenario: Normal market risk (risk of average public traded stock) with unlevered beta = ΒU = 1 
EU rate = rU = rF + ΒU (rM – rF) = 0.05 + 1(0.11 – 0.05) = 0.11 Interest for retiring 30%EU: I = $269,473.68 
2nd Discount Rate Scenario: High market risk (double all betas) with unlevered beta = ΒU = 2 
EU rate = rU = rF + ΒU (rM – rF) = 0.05 + 2(0.11 – 0.05) = 0.17 Interest for retiring 30%EU: I = $169,670.50 
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We will use (where applicable) the values for variables given in the prior CSM 
application by Hull (2008) that uses equation (1). Despite our attempt to use similar 
values for variables, there are several major differences between this paper and prior CSM 
applied illustrations. 
First, tax rates now depend on the ownership structure. In addition, this paper 
examines different sets of tax rates. This is seen in Table 1 where we introduce the four 
primary sets of tax rates used in this paper’s comparison: two sets for a pass-through and 
two sets for a C Corp. As described later, other sets are used in robustness tests. 
Second, in keeping with our intent of analyzing smaller entrepreneurial 
enterprises, we reduce the size of the cash flows from billions used in prior CSM 
illustrations to millions for this paper’s illustration. In essence, we simply divide the 
before-tax perpetuity unlevered cash flows used in prior CSM illustrations by one 
thousand. Of importance, the pass-through and the C Corp that we compare in this 
paper will have the same before-tax cash flows and the same discount rates. Thus, the 
only difference will be tax rates that are determined by ownership structure. 
Third, we test two different discount rate scenarios with one scenario having betas 
twice that of the other scenario. We see in Table 1 that the cost of unlevered equity (rU) 
= 11% when ΒU = 1 but rU = 17% when ΒU = 2. The computation for these values use 
the CAPM and its risk-free and market rates given in Table 1. When we use the βU = 2 
assumption, we also double all other betas used by Hull (2008) when computing his 
levered equity returns and debt returns. Because before-tax unlevered equity cash flows 
are fixed, greater betas lead to greater discount rates and thus smaller firm values. This 
explains why the interest in Table 1 is smaller for the 2nd discount rate scenario where 
betas are doubled. When EU is smaller, the amount of debt to retire the same percentage 
is less. 
C. Illustration for a tax rate set and a discount rate scenario 
 
In the upper portion of Table 2, we report values for variables for each designated 
P value where P refers to the debt choice or percentage of EU retired by debt. To illustrate, 
the P = 50% choice means that enough debt was issued to retire 50% of outstanding 
shares with the value of these shares equal to 50% EU. For brevity’s sake, Table 2 only 
reports values for the first of our four sets of tax rates and the first of our two discount 
rate scenarios. Values using this tax rate set with the second discount rate scenario are 
computed in the same way. Similarly, values for the other three tax rate sets combined 
with a discount rate scenario are also computed in the same way. 
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Like prior CSM illustrations and for practical reasons, we focus on a finite 
number choices of debt-for-equity transactions with each subsequent choice increasing 
by 10%. The range of choices or P values in Table 2 are from 0% to 100% where 0% 
and 100% are the same since a 100% debt-for-equity transaction would by law make the 
debt owners become equity owners. The “30%” column where debt retires 30% EU is 
given in bold print to highlight the fact that this column gives optimal GL and VL values. 
With the risk-free rate and market return given in Table 1 and the beta information in 
Table 2, costs of borrowing for debt and equity (rD and rL) are computed for each P using 
the CAPM. The rD and rL values reported in Table 2 for the normal risk scenario were 
first formulated by Hull (2008) to be consistent with the betas and debt ratings advocated 
by Pratt and Grabowski (2008). 
In the lower portion of Table 2, we use costs of borrowings, tax rates and the 
perpetual cash flows for equity and debt to show how EU, D and GL are calculated for the 
optimal debt choice of P = 30%. While the computations are not shown in Table 2 for 
the last five values, they can be calculated as follows. VL = GL + EU. EL = VL – D, %ΔEU 
= GL/EU  in percentage form, NB = GL/D in percentage form and DE  = D/EL. NB refers 
to the “net benefit to leverage factor” and when multiplied by the amount of after-
personal tax debt equals GL. The optimal DE  value is ODE. 
The %ΔEU of 7.77% in the “30%” column of Table 2 for ODE of 0.386 is 
consistent with the research (Graham, 2000; Korteweg, 2010; Van Binsbergen et al., 
2010). For example, this research collectively suggests that GL can be as much as 10% of 
a typical C Corp’s value at its ODE. In addition, the %ΔEU values reported later in Tables 
3 and 4 are also consistent with prior research. This is especially true for our normal risk 
results. All GL values in Table 2 for each P choice are computed using (1) with each GL 
composed of POS and NEG values given in (2). If desired, more details on computations 
can be found in Hull (2008). 
 
IV. CSM Applied to a Pass-Through 
 
 This section examines an unlevered non-growth pass-through enterprise as it 
undergoes a debt-for-equity transaction. The following section will investigate a C Corp 
with the same before-tax unlevered value. By assuming a pass-through and C Corp of 
the same size, we can use identical before-tax cash flows and discount rates. Regardless, 
our analysis would not be hampered with different cash flows because we include  
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Table 2: Illustration using 1st Set of Pass-through Tax Rates of TC = 0, TE = 0.20 and TD 
= 0.25 and 1st Discount Rate Scenario with Normal Market Risk where βU = βM 
= 1.0 
NOTE: When P = 0, we have: βD is not applicable or 0; equity beta (ΒE) = ΒU or 1; rD = rF or 0.05; 
and, rL = rU or 0.11. Where applicable, values are in millions of dollars. Bold print gives values for 
optimal GL and VL values. 
 P = Debt Choice or Percentage of EU Retired by Debt (or %EU Retired) 
Variables 0%
 
10%
 
20%
 
30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80%
 
90%
 
100%
D =P(EU) 0.000
 
1.203 2.406 3.609 4.812 6.015 7.218 8.421 9.624 10.827 0.000 
ΒD 0.000 0.010 0.050 0.100 0.170 0.270 0.390 0.530 0.690 0.880 0.000 
ΒE 1.000 1.020 1.060 1.140 1.250 1.380 1.550 1.750 1.980 2.240 1.000 
rD 0.0500  0.0506 0.0530 0.0560 0.0602 0.0662 0.0734 0.0818 0.0914 0.1028 0.0500 
rL 0.1100 0.1112 0.1136 0.1184 0.1250 0.1328 0.1430 0.1550 0.1688 0.1844 0.1100 
POS 0.000
 
0.619 1.209 1.788 2.340 2.817 3.266 3.681 4.066 4.389 0.000 
NEG 0.000 -0.130 -0.381 -0.853 -1.444 -2.065 -2.776 -3.493 -4.191 -4.854 0.000 
GL 0.000 0.489 0.827 0.935 0.896 0.751 0.490 0.188 -0.125 -0.465 0.000 
VL 12.030 12.519 12.857 12.965 12.927 12.781 12.520 12.218 11.905 11.565 12.030 
EL 12.030 11.316 10.451 9.356 8.114 6.766 5.302 3.797 2.281 0.738 12.030 
%∆EU 0.00% 4.07% 6.88% 7.77% 7.45% 6.24% 4.07% 1.56% -1.04% -3.87% 0.00% 
NB 0.00% 40.7% 34.4% 25.9% 18.6% 12.5% 6.79% 2.23% -1.30% -4.30% 0.00% 
D
E  0.000 0.106 0.230 0.386 0.593 0.889 1.361 2.218 4.219 14.671 0.000 
Before-tax: EU (or VU) = 
U
C
r  = 
)(1
U
BTPBR CF
r

 with PBR = 0 (non-growth), CFBT = $1,654,135.34 
and rU = 0.11, we get: EU = 
(1 0 $1,654,135.3
1
) 4
0.1

= $15,037,593.98 
After-tax: EU (or VU) = 
(1 )(1 )
U
E CT T C
r
 
 = 
(1(1 )(1 ) )
U
E C BTT T
r
PBR CF 
 with PBR = 0 (non-growth), 
CFBT = $1,654,135.34, TE = 0.20, and TC = 0, we get: 
EU = 
 ( $1 0.20)(1 0)(1 0)
0.
1,654,1
1
35.34
1
  
 = $1,323,308.270.11  = $12,030,075 
For the optimal choice of P = 30% where debt retires 30%EU and I = $269,473.68, we have: 
D = P(EU) = 0.3($12,030,075) = $3,609,023 or D = 
(1 )
D
DT I
r

 = 
269,473.(1 0.25)$
0.
68
0560

 = $3,609,023  
Using equation (1) we have:    D ELG   = 1      1  UD U
L L
D Errr r
            = 
  1.066667 0.056) $3,609,0( 0.111      1  0.1184 023 $12,030,.1184 075
           = $1,788,254 – $853,485 = $934,769 
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percentage changes and fractions in our analysis and we could normalize other values as 
needed. Despite this paper’s similar use of values found in prior CSM exercises and 
applications, the results of this paper can deviate from prior applications because we use 
tax rates based on two different ownership structures and discount rates based on two 
divergent beta scenarios. 
 
A. Non-growth pass-through with normal market risk 
 
 For our pass-through applications for a non-growth situation using (1), we test 
the two sets of personal tax rates on equity and debt income that were introduced in 
Table 1. As argued previously, both sets are feasible for a pass-through enterprise. 
Regardless, as described later, our results are largely invariant to both the size of the 
personal tax rates and the differential between them especially for realistic values and 
differentials. 
 As shown earlier in Table 1 and repeated in the first rows of Panels A and B in 
Table 3, our first set of tax rates are TE = 0.20, TD = 0.25 and TC = 0. For the normal risk 
results in Panel A, we report an after-tax unlevered equity (EU) of $12.030M (where M 
= millions) for which this EU was computed in Table 2. For our second set of tax rates, 
we maintain the 0.05 differential between personal tax rates but switch the values for TE 
and TD by using TE = 0.25, TD = 0.20 and TC = 0. This gives an after-tax EU of $11.278M 
in the second row of Panel A, which is smaller than the EU in the first row due to its 
higher personal tax on equity. Both of these after-tax EU values of $12.030M and 
$11.278M have the same before-tax EU value that was computed as $15,037,593.98 in 
Table 2. 
 For the first set of tax rates, the first row of Panel A in Table 3 reports that firm 
value is maximized by issuing debt to retire 30% EU. This gives maximum GL (called max 
GL) of $0.935M; maximum levered firm value (called max VL) of $12.965M; %ΔEU of 
7.77%; NB of 25.90%; and, ODE of 0.386. Thus, in after-tax dollars, debt increases 
firm value by 7.7%, the firm can add $25.9 to EU for every $100 of debt issued; and, the 
firm optimally finances with $38.6 in debt for every $100 of equity. These values given 
in the first row of Panel A in Table 3 were also shown in Table 2 in the “30%” column. 
Values for other P choices between 0% and 100% were also shown in Table 2. There we 
get insight into the concave relation between GL and VL with leverage that is respectively 
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visualized in Figure 1 and Figure 2. This concave relation is consistent with trade-off 
theory. 
 
Table 3: Non-growth results for a pass-through using equation (1) 
 %EU 
Retired EU Max GL Max VL %ΔEU NB ODE 
Panel A Normal Risk 
TE = 0.20; TD = 
0.25; TC = 0 
30%EU 12.030M 0.935M 12.965M 7.77% 25.90% 0.386 
TE = 0.25; TD = 
0.20; TC = 0 
40%EU 11.278M 1.121M 12.399M 9.94% 24.85% 0.572 
Panel B High Risk (double betas) 
TE = 0.20; TD = 
0.25; TC = 0 
30% EU 7.784M 0.808M 8.593M 10.39% 34.62% 0.373 
TE = 0.25; TD = 
0.20; TC = 0 
40% EU 7.298M 0.861M 8.159M 11.80% 29.50% 0.557 
 
For the second set of rates in the second row of Panel A where TE = 0.25, TD = 
0.20 and TC = 0, we find firm value is now maximized by issuing debt to retire 40%EU 
instead of 30%EU found in the first row. This is caused by TD being lower at 0.20 so that 
there is now more advantage to debt because debt owners pay less taxes. With 40%EU 
retired, we get max GL = $1.121M, max VL = $12.399M, %ΔEU of 9.94%, NB = 24.85%, 
and ODE = 0.572. Despite the advantage for equity valuation when TE = 0.20, the highest 
max GL results occur when TE = 0.25 because a lower TD = 0.20 leads to more debt and 
thus a higher GL. However, the lower TD does not create enough of an increase in GL to 
offset the advantage of a lower TE when valuing VL. This is seen from the max VL values of 
$12.965M for when TE is 0.20 in the first row of Panel A compared to max VL of 
$12.399M when TE is 0.25 in the second row. 
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 Figure 1 presents Panel A’s two sets of results for GL for each choice from 0% to 
100% where if P = 100% the enterprise legally reverts back to its unlevered condition. 
In this figure, GL is plotted along the vertical axis (with values in millions of dollars) and 
the percent of unlevered equity retired (or P values representing debt choices) along the 
horizontal axis. This figure clearly portrays that a pass-through gains more from leverage 
if it can get financing from debt owners who have a lower personal tax rate of TD = 0.20 
(instead of TD = 0.25). The pass-through will also end of up issuing more debt and have 
a higher ODE. 
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Figure 1: GL for two sets of tax rates and normal risk
1st Set: TC = 0, TE = 0.20, TD = 0.25; Max GL = $0.935M; ODE = 0.386
2nd Set: TC = 0, TE = 0.25, TD = 0.20; Max GL= $1.121M; ODE = 0.572
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 In Figure 2, we graphically illustrate that VL is higher when TE = 0.20 (instead of 
TE = 0.25) for all debt choices except the highest debt choices. In this figure, VL is plotted 
along the vertical axis (with values in millions of dollars) and the percent of unlevered 
equity retired along the horizontal axis. With higher debt choices, the advantage to equity 
of a lower tax rate is lost because most of the equity has been retired. The results for 
doubling the market risk are discussed later but we could also show the same patterns found 
in Figure 1 and Figure 2 if we doubled the market risk. 
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Figure 2: VL for two sets of tax rates and normal risk
1st Set: TC = 0, TE = 0.20, TD = 0.25; Max VL = $12.965M; ODE = 0.386
2nd Set: TC = 0, TE = 0.25, TD = 0.20; Max VL= $12.399M; ODE = 0.572
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B. Robustness of Results 
 
 We tested other TE and TD values and found the same pattern of results. For 
example, we examined personal tax values from 0 to as high as 0.70 but, as long as there 
was a 0.05 differential between TE and TD, the general results were alike in that the same 
30%EU and 40%EU were retired when generating the max GL. As might be expected, 
whenever TE and TD values were lower but with the same 0.05 differential, the GL and 
VL values were higher since values are reported on an after-tax basis (which for pass-
throughs are simply on an after-personal tax basis) and less personal taxes mean higher 
after-tax values. Despite the fact max GL and max VL increase as personal tax rates fall, 
differences between max GL and max VL differ very little whenever rates fall as long as the 
0.05 differential is maintained. This is true regardless as to whether TE > TD by 0.05 or 
TD > TE by 0.05. 
 We also tried a 0.10 differential and for reasonable personal tax rates (e.g., those 
under the current maximum of 0.396), the same two debt choices of 30%EU retired and 
40%EU retired were always found to maximized value. When we tried a 0.15 differential, 
we got similar results with one exception. When TE was greater than TD by a 0.15 
differential, the 40%EU retired increased to 50%EU retired but the increase in value (as 
measured by %ΔEU variable) was very minor and virtually unnoticeable. Thus, the 
40%EU and 50%EU choices yield about the same increase in value. Regardless, as TE 
separates itself from TD by becoming increasingly greater, then more debt is likely to 
result since the personal tax advantage to issuing debt increases. 
 What if TE = TD? We examined this question for rates from 0 to 0.70 and found 
that as long as personal tax rates were equal, then the enterprise retired 40%EU. Thus, 
these results are the same as that for the tax rates set of TE = 0.25, TD = 0.20 and TC = 0. 
 
C. Capital structure decision rules for managers of pass-throughs 
 
 From our analysis just completed, an important conclusion can be made: our 
choice of how much EU to retire for a pass-through is generally invariant to the size of TE 
and TD and a reasonably large differential between TE and TD. Thus, even if our sets of 
tax rates are not found for a particular enterprise, our general results still hold as to what 
percent of equity should be retired. This is important for managers of pass-throughs in 
the U.S.A. or countries with similar tax rate structures as they simply need to follow this 
general rule when making their capital structure decision. 
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General Rule for Normal Market Risk 
If TE > TD then retire 30% EU and if TD ≥ TE then retire 40% EU. 
 To determine to what extent this rule is confined to the differential range of 0.05 to 
0.15 mentioned previously, we tested other differentials in personal tax rates on debt and 
income equity to determine if we could drop the 0.05 cut-off or increase the 0.15 cut-off. 
We found the lower cut-off could be dropped down to 0.01. To illustrate, when we tested a 
0.01 differential in personal tax rates, the %EU retired was not altered and this test was true 
for TE and TD values up to 90%. We did further tests to refine the 0.15 differential as a cut-
off and found that a more precise cut-off could not be made that covered both TE > TD and 
TD > TE. When TE > TD, the cut-off depended on the size of the personal tax rates as the cut-
off fell below the 0.15 differential as the personal tax rates increased. When TD > TE, the 0.15 
cut-off did hold but this 0.15 cut-off increased to a 0.19 differential as the personal tax rates 
become smaller. 
 Thus, a more precise statement of our general rule for managers of a non-growth 
pass-through is: 
Precise Rule for Normal Market Risk 
If TE > TD then retire 30% EU if the differential is between 0 and 0.10 with 
the differential increasing from 0 to 0.15 for smaller personal tax rates, and 
if TD ≥ TE then retire 40% EU if the differential is between 0 and 0.15 with 
the differential increasing from 0 to 0.19 for smaller personal tax rates. 
As will be covered next, both the general and the precise rule are similar for high market 
risk.  
 
D. Non-growth pass-through with high market risk 
 
 Up to this point, we have assumed that the discount rates for our pass-through 
are those for a normal company with average market risk. Let us now assume that our 
pass-through has twice as much market or nondiversifiable risk by doubling the betas we 
have been using. For example, we took the betas of Hull (2008) that we have been using 
to compute costs of borrowing and doubled them. Thus, the unlevered equity beta 
increased from βU = 1 to βU = 2. Similarly, we doubled all other debt and levered equity 
betas of Hull and used the CAPM to recompute discount rates, all of which became 
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much greater when beta increases. The results when doubling betas are reported in Panel 
B of Table 3. In comparing the two panels in this table, we can find many general 
similarities in terms of how values change from the first set of tax rates to the second set 
of tax rates. However, there are fall-offs in perpetuity values when cash flows are 
discounted by higher costs of borrowings. For example, the reported max GL values of 
$0.935M and $1.121M in Panel A fall to $0.808M and $0.861M in Panel B. While 
max GL and max VL values fall, %ΔEU values increase noticeably. With betas doubled, 
the NB values increase while the ODE values decrease slightly. 
 All of these changes with betas doubled give the appearance of a substantial 
difference. However, the key variable of the “% EU Retired” does not change as the first 
rows in both panel are 30% EU retired and the second rows are both 40% EU retired. 
Thus, despite the differences, the pass-through’s managerial decision-making is 
unchanged because the same percent of unlevered equity is retired. We conducted further 
high market risk tests and found results similar to those reported earlier for normal 
market risk tests including differential cut-offs. However, one dissimilarity was a 
tendency to retire less unlevered equity. To illustrate, when personal tax rates are equal, 
the rules given earlier for normal market risk change so that the “>” and “≥” signs are 
switched. Thus, we have this general rule for a pass-through manager for high market 
risk: 
General Rule for High Market Risk 
If TE ≥ TD then retire 30% EU and if TD > TE then retire 40% EU. 
 Similarly, we have this precise rule for a pass-through manager for high market risk: 
Precise Rule for High Market Risk 
If TE ≥ TD then retire 30%EU if the differential is between 0 and 0.10 with the 
differential increasing from 0 to 0.15 for smaller personal tax rates, and if TD > 
TE then retire 40%EU if the differential is between 0 and 0.15 with the 
differential increasing from 0 to 0.19 for smaller personal tax rates. 
Thus, any rule offered to managers would be very similar regardless of the market risk 
assumed to hold. The only minor alteration would be switching the “>” and “≥” signs 
as dictated by the market risk. 
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V. Pass-Through versus C Corp Comparison Using CSM 
 
 Pass-throughs and C Corps can take on an array of similar sizes and thus 
analogous characteristics.3 This means we can do a comparative analysis assuming a 
situation where a pass-through and a C Corp are alike in terms of cash flows and risk 
factors leading to similar discount rates. Thus key variables can be identical except for 
corporate and personal tax rates that are unique to each of the two ownership structures. 
In this section, we compare a pass-through and C Corp to determine if there are any 
differences in these two ownership structures. We repeat our prior analysis for a pass-
through by doing it for a C Corp. For our C Corp analysis, we use the same before-tax 
cash flow and discount rates that were used for our pass-through. The major difference 
in our C Corp analysis are in tax rates as C Corps are governed by different tax laws. 
While pass-throughs pay no tax on corporate or business income, profitable C Corps can 
pay a high effective tax rate and also have lower effective personal tax rates (especially for 
equity income) stemming from U.S.A. tax legislation described in Section II.B. For 
reasons described there, we fix TE at 0.05 and TD at 0.15 for all C Corp tests. We examine 
two TC values of 0.20 and 0.30 for reasons also explained previously in Section II.B. 
 
A. Comparison of the results for the two ownership structures 
 
 Table 4 reports our C Corp results. We will highlight five observations when 
comparing the seven columns in this table with those in Table 3. In this comparison, we 
remind the reader that whereas our assigned tax rates are reasonable estimates, they are 
not applicable to all pass-throughs and C Corps. 
 First, we find after-tax firm values given for the pass-through in Table 3 are 
greater than the corresponding C Corp values in Table 4. This is seen by comparing the 
                                                 
 
 
3 Whereas we can associate pass-throughs with small companies like a sole proprietorship, there are no 
restrictive limits on size as there are plenty of multi-million and even multi-billion dollar pass-throughs. 
For example, large LLC pass-throughs include Chrysler Group, Kaiser Permanente, and Mars Chocolate 
North America. A sole proprietorship might also desire to be a corporation for a number of reasons 
including a desire to have limited liability, establish a plan making its health costs deductible, and deduct 
a number of fringe benefits. 
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“EU” and “Max VL” columns in Tables 3 and 4. Computing averages for EU and max VL 
values in each table and comparing the percentage difference in averages for both EU and 
max VL, we find that the pass-through has percentage differences that yield an 8.1% 
greater EU and a 5.8% greater max VL. The difference between corporate tax rates for the 
pass-through and C Corp is vast enough so that the personal tax advantage that the C 
Corp enjoys over the pass-through cannot overcome the disadvantage that the C Corp 
has from having to pay corporate taxes. However, the firm valuation advantage for the 
pass-through does not appear to be as great as one might expect. This is especially true 
for max VL where the difference amounts to only 5.8%. This difference would be greater 
were it not for the greater advantage of leverage for C Corps as discussed next. 
 Second, in comparing Tables 3 and 4, we discover a greater advantage to leverage 
is achieved for the C Corp. This is seen by comparing the “Max GL” and “%ΔEU” 
columns in Tables 3 and 4 where we find that a C Corp has higher values. Computing 
averages for max GL and %ΔEU values in each table and comparing the percentage 
difference in averages for max GL and %ΔEU, we find that the C Corp has percentage 
differences that yield a 15.1% greater max GL and a 21.0% greater %ΔEU. We attribute 
these greater gains from leverage to the C Corp’s capacity to lower their corporate taxable 
income through the interest deduction that lowers its corporate tax payment. For a pass-  
 
Table 4: Non-growth results for a C Corp using equation (1)  
 %EU 
Retired EU Max GL Max VL %ΔEU NB ODE 
Panel A Normal Risk 
TE = 0.05; TD = 
0.15; TC = 0.20 
40% EU 11.429M 1.232M 12.660M 10.78% 26.94% 0.565 
TE = 0.05; TD = 
0.15; TC = 0.30 
50% EU 10.000M 1.333M 11.333M 13.33% 26.66% 0.789 
Panel B High Risk (double betas) 
TE = 0.05; TD = 
0.15; TC = 0.20 
40% EU 7.395M 0.918M 8.313M 12.41% 31.03% 0.552 
TE = 0.05; TD = 
0.15; TC = 0.30 
40% EU 6.471M 0.905M 7.375M 13.98% 34.96% 0.662 
 
through that does not pay corporate taxes, the interest they pay cannot lower its corporate 
tax payment because it is already zero. 
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Third, we find higher debt levels are achieved for the C Corp. This is seen in 
comparing the “%EU Retired” and “ODE” columns in Tables 3 and 4. This finding is 
consistent with the fact C Corps achieve a greater advantage from leverage compared to 
pass-throughs. With a greater advantage from leverage, it stands to reason that such an 
advantage would be positively correlated with greater levels of debt. Computing averages 
for %EU Retired and ODE values in each table and comparing the percentage difference 
in averages for both %EU Retired and ODE, we find that the C Corp has percentage 
differences that yield a 17.65% greater %EU Retired and a 26.48% greater ODE. As 
might be expected, these percentages are comparable to 15.11% greater max GL and a 
20.99% greater %ΔEU. 
 Fourth, the NB values do not fully reflect the greater C Corp gain from leverage 
since an NB value focuses on efficiency by considering the dollar of total firm value added 
per dollar of debt added. In this regards, the C Corp is slightly more efficient. Computing 
averages for NB values in each table and comparing the percentage difference in averages, 
we find that the C Corp has a percentage difference that yields a 3.95% greater NB. 
Thus, whereas the C Corp issues more debt, it is still more efficient than the pass-
through. With less of a tax advantage, the pass-through still has other positive leverage 
related effects that can be explained in terms of a positive agency shield notion advocated 
by Hull (2007) who states: 
Thus, instead of being just a tax shield component, the 1st component takes on an 
additional category that can be identified with an “agency shield” effect because it 
is consistent with agency theory that hypothesizes debt can be positive for reasons 
other than a tax shield. A positive agency shield effect can be viewed as stemming 
from a synergistic impact due simply to how ownership claims are packaged and sold 
(with regard to risk) to “shield” the firm from costs associated with agency behavior. 
Related to the packaging and selling of securities is the fact that the cost of debt is lower 
than the cost of equity even without any deduction of interest. 
 Fifth, we find that the reactions to the doubling of betas do not differ a lot when 
we compare the pass-through and C Corp. For example, all of the four general 
conclusions just given above are true for both normal and high market risk. Regardless, 
there are differences in the degrees of reaction to an increase in market risk. For example, 
pass-throughs fare better (e.g., less negatively affected) from leverage compared to C 
Corps when betas double, and C Corps take on less leverage when market risk increases 
while pass-throughs are virtually unaffected. Below we supply more details when 
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comparing normal market risk results with high market risk results for the seven variables 
in Tables 3 and 4. 
 In terms of firm values when market risk doubles, the average percentage drop in 
EU is the same as both enterprises fall 35.3%. Similarly, for VL, as the respective declines 
in pass-through and C Corps are largely indistinguishable at 34.0% and 34.7%. In terms 
of what ownership structure profits the most from leverage when betas double, the results 
indicate that the pass-through benefits more. To illustrate, the average percentage drop 
in max GL for the pass-through is 18.4% while the C Corp declines 28.8%, and the 
average percentage increase in %ΔEU for the pass-through is 26.2% while the C Corp 
only increases 10.0%. How does increased market risk affect the debt level? While a pass-
through is unaffected in its %ΔEU, the C Corp has less leverage when TC is higher at 
0.30. This result is reflected in the ODE variables where the average percentage decrease 
in ODE for the pass-through is only 3.0% compared to 9.2% for the C Corp. In term 
of the net benefit to leverage, both ownership structures are positively affected by 
doubling betas. To illustrate, the increase in NB is 26.2% for the pass-through, which is 
slightly better than the 23.2% for the C Corp. 
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Figure 3: GLPass-Through versus GLCCorp
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B. Comparing the two ownership structures for each debt choice 
 
 Given the pass-through’s huge advantage of not paying corporate taxes, its firm 
value (VL) is not as great as one might expect compared to the C Corp. As noted in the 
last section, the reason is that a C Corp gains more from debt due to its capacity to lower 
its taxable income. We now investigate in more detail as to why the pass-through’s VL 
advantage dwindles as more debt is issued to retire equity. We do by looking at Figures 
3, 4 and 5. In Figure 3, we will compare GL values between our two ownership structures 
for each debt choice or P value given in Table 2. Each debt choice represents the 
percentage of unlevered equity retired by debt. In Figure 4, we compare the VL values for 
the pass-through and the C Corp for each debt choice. In Figure 5, we analyze the 
difference when subtracting pass-through VL values from C Corp VL values. 
 Figure 3 illustrates a comparison of GL results for the pass-through versus the C 
Corp as greater debt-for-equity transactions are undertaken. For this figure, GL Pass-Through 
refers to GL for the pass-through and GL Corporation refers to the C Corp with GL values in 
million. In this figure, GL values are plotted along the vertical axis (with values in millions 
of dollars) and the percent of unlevered equity retired (or P values representing debt 
choices) along horizontal axis. For this figure’s comparison, we choose sets of tax rates 
that generate the largest max GL. For our pass-through, Table 3 reveals the set of tax rates 
giving max GL is TE = 0.25, TD = 0.20 and TC = 0. For our C Corp, Table 4 shows that 
max GL is achieved with TE = 0.05; TD = 0.15; TC = 0.30. 
 As seen in Figure 3, the max GL Corporation of $1.333M is greater than that of 
$1.121M for max GL Pass-Through. Part of the greater max GL Corporation is achieved by issuing 
debt to retire 50% EU compared to 40% EU for GL Pass-Through. At the 40% EU level for both 
the C Corp and pass-through, the advantage for the C Corp is only $1.293M – $1.121M 
= $0.072M. However, at the 50% EU level, the advantage for the C Corp increases almost 
four-fold to $1.333M – $1.067M = $0.266M. Thus, as greater debt-for-equity 
transactions take place, the advantage to a C Corp becomes greater. While the details are 
omitted, it can be noted that the general pattern of GL differences given in Figure 3 can 
be found for other sets of tax rates since the C Corp’s GL is always greater when the level 
of market risk is the same. 
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 Since VL is just EU plus GL, we can get a clearer understanding of how increasing 
GL values cut into the pass-through’s valuation compared to a C Corp by looking at VL 
values. We do this in Figure 4 where VL Pass-Through refers to VL for the pass-through, VL C Corp 
refers to the VL for C Corp and VL values are in millions of dollars. In this figure, VL values 
correspond with the vertical axis (with values in millions of dollars) and the percent of 
unlevered equity retired along horizontal axis. For this figure’s comparison of the two 
ownership structures, we use the same set of tax rates used in Figure 3. From Figure 4, 
we can visualize how greater increasing GL values for the C Corp causes the difference 
between VL Pass-Through and VL Corporation to decrease as the debt choice increases. The decrease 
in differences between firm values continues steadily up to the debt choice of P = 90% 
(recall for P = 100% the levered firm reverts to an unlevered firm by legal definition). 
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 Figure 5 presents the differences between the VL values in Figure 4. Each 
difference for a debt choice represents VL Pass-Through minus VL C Corp where differences are 
expressed in millions of dollars and these differences are plotted along the vertical axis 
and the percent of unlevered equity retired (or debt choices) along horizontal axis. From 
Figure 5, we see the initial difference of $1.278M falls as more and more debt is issued 
to retire equity. It falls to $1.106M at the point where the pass-through maximizes GL, 
which is the retirement of 40% EU. The difference falls to $1.012M when the C Corp 
maximizes GL by retiring 50% EU. If 90% retirement was achieved, the difference would 
only by $0.533M, which represents a fall of nearly 60% from the unlevered difference 
of $1.278M. It is conceivable that any advantage a pass-through might have over a C 
Corp can be overcome, in some cases at least, when we consider the effect of leverage 
especially if the C Corp achieves its ODE as a high debt level. In fact, this is almost the 
case if we compare the other two sets of tax rates. For this latter comparison, VL C Corp 
becomes greater than VL Pass-Through at P = 70%, which is the P choices after both would 
have already achieved their max VL values. 
 Together Figures 3, 4 and 5 highlight the superior values obtained by the pass-
through as well as the deterioration of these superior values as the firm issues more debt. 
Obviously, the degree of the differences between pass-throughs and C Corps can differ 
based on many factors with two important factors including costs of borrowings and tax 
rates. While the values we have chosen to use are believed to be realistic, more research 
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is needed to understand comparisons between pass-throughs and C Corps. Hopefully, 
this paper has begun the process by supplying a model of taxation − albeit this taxation 
model occurs within a larger context that also includes agency effects and financial 
distress effects. For the CSM, these latter two effects are inherently contained in its 
framework. In conclusion, we have shown that the CSM provides a model applicable to 
two general ownership structures of pass-throughs and C Corps. 
 
VI. Final Comments and Future Research 
 
 This paper determines the optimal debt-equity ratio (ODE) that maximizes firm 
value for pass-through and C Corp ownership structures. Our valuation process relies on 
the non-growth Capital Model Structure (CSM) framework by Hull (2007) that 
generates the debt-to-equity gain to leverage (GL) equation used in this paper when 
determining the maximum levered firm value (max VL). 
 When applying the CSM, we are able to show that a pass-through achieves a 
higher max GL, a lower max VL and a greater ODE when its personal tax rate on equity 
(TE) is greater than its personal tax rate on debt (TD). A greater GL advantage with a lower 
personal tax rate on debt cannot offset the loss in equity value from paying greater taxes 
on equity income. Thus, a lower max VL results. Our results are robust for innumerable 
tests where tax rates are altered and this is particularly true if the tax rates fall within 
statutory limits. Also, we find that market risk does not influence the percent of 
unlevered equity that is retired.  
 We offer rules for managers of pass-throughs on how much equity to retire. The 
general rule for normal market risk (β = 1) is: 
If TE > TD then retire 30% EU and if TD ≥ TE then retire 40% EU. 
Our more precise rule for normal market risk that considers the differential between TE 
and TD is: 
If TE > TD then retire 30% EU if the differential is between 0 and 0.10 with 
the differential increasing from 0 to 0.15 for smaller personal tax rates, and 
if TD ≥ TE then retire 40% EU if the differential is between 0 and 0.15 with 
the differential increasing from 0 to 0.19 for smaller personal tax rates. 
For greater market risk (β = 2), these two rules are only slightly modified by switching 
the “>” and “≥” signs. 
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 After analyzing capital structure decision-making for a pass-through, we next 
illustrate that an enterprise’s max GL, max VL and ODE can fluctuate based on ownership 
structures that exhibit differences in corporate and personal tax rates. We find that pass-
throughs tend to issue less debt leading to lower ODEs compared to C Corps. Pass-
throughs also attain lower max GL values. Despite lower max GL values, we show that the 
pass-through ownership structure consistently achieves higher max VL results. Finally, 
while affecting the valuation process by lessening values, greater betas do not change 
general conclusions when comparing a pass-through and a C Corp. 
 While the findings we present might be expected given we assume a typical pass-
through and C Corp, the CSM framework we used to generate these findings can also 
yield less likely results for other possible situations. For example, the CSM framework 
can be used to generate results for enterprises that might have atypical tax rates. To 
illustrate, if we had used a situation where a pass-through achieved the maximum 
statutory personal tax rates, we could have demonstrated the pass-through now has lower 
values than the C Corp for EU and VL for all debt choices. This would conflict with what 
we report in this paper. Or consider a C Corp with a lower effective corporate tax rate 
such as 0.10 instead of 0.20 and 0.30. This would also change the outcomes because 
lower effective corporate tax rates will increase EU and also increase VL for all debt choices 
even though GL values fall. Once again, results divergent from those reported in this 
paper would result. 
 Besides not examining less likely tax rate scenarios, this paper did not investigate 
other areas covered by the current CSM research. For example, this paper did not use 
the CSM with growth given by Hull (2011). Future research can explore the new 
equations of Hull (2014) that allow changes in tax rates within two GL components. 
Before Hull discovered a second “α” factor in his 2nd component, there was only one α 
in a CSM equation that considered personal and corporate tax rates and that was the 
Miller (1977) α factor. Hull has offered evidence that his newly discovered α factor can 
be a more decisive factor than the Miller α factor on capital structure decision-making. 
It remains to be seen if future research on pass-throughs can show the relevance of this 
second α factor in an extension of this paper’s study. 
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